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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE,
)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
)

v.

No. 16342

)

MILAN MACK BOYCE,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for an equitable property distribution,
alimony, and child support payments following dissolution of the
marriage of plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
David B. Dee, presiding, denied appellant's motions to set
aside the decree of divorce, for relief from the final decree
and to modify the decree of divorce.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of the Amended
Judgment and Order of January 31, 1979 denying appellant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-1-Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Motion to Set Aside the Decree, Motion for Relief from Final
Decree and Motion to Modify Divorce Decree and ordering
appellant to remove the lis pendens previously filed by her
in connection with this action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because of the complexity of the facts in this case,
appellant will set out her Statement of Facts in two parts.
First is a procedural overview necessitated by the volume of
the file herein.

This overview will'serve to fix the chronolog)

involved which is unclear from the file.

Second is a review of

the facts which came to light after the entry of the Decree
of Divorce and which show that respondent at the time of the
divorce had

fraud~lencly

misled the appellant and the court

below as to his true assets in order to prevent appellant from
receiving her fair and equitable share of the assets of the
parties on dissolution of the marriage.
A.

Procedural overview

On May 27, 1977, appellant filed her Complaint in
the Third District Court, together with a Motion for Temporary
Support.

Respondent requested a formal hearing on the above-

described Motion by way of a pleading entitled Notice, which
was filed on June 24, 1977.

-2-
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On July 28, 1977! appellant filed an Affidavit to
the effect that she had no knowledge of the financial condition of respondent.

By Order signed on July 28, 1977, a hearing

requiring respondent to appear and show cause why he should not
be required to make a full accounting of his assets and liabilities was set for September 6, 1977.

Respondent filed his Answer

to appellant's Complaint on August l, 1977.
At the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, counsel
for respondent requested a continuance ''for the reason that
defendant's business schedule would not allow him to appear
on September 6, 1977." (R. 17)

The hearing was continued to

September 27, 1977 at which time appellant's Motion for Temporary Support was also to be heard.
On September 12, 1977, appellant filed her First Set
of Interrogatories to Milan Mack Boyce.
At the September 27th hearing, respondent testified
that he was renting his current residence from and was paid a
salary by Insul-Guard Corporation, of which he was president.
When asked by his attorney who owned the corporation, respondent
answered:

A.

Well, shareholders.

Q.

Do you own an interest in that corporation?

A.

I own a small interest in it, yes.

Q.

What interest do you own?

A.

I don't honestly know because I have so
many commitments out to others.
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(R. 251-252)

As a result of this hearing, respondent was ordered to pay $400
per month temporary support, to allow appellant the use of an
automobile, and to maintain in force a policy of health insuran1
for the benefit of appellant and the minor children of the part
On December 5, 1977, appellant filed a Motion for Ord1
Compelling Discovery or in the Alternative, Motion for Entry of
Default Judgment.
December 21, 1977.

Said Motion was noticed up for hearing on
As a result of that hearing, respondent was

ordered to answer the Interrogatories propounded by appellant
on or before January 11, 1978, or failing that, respondent's
Answer would be stricken and his default entered.

On December

22, 1977, the case was set for trial on February 7, 1978, befor
Judge David Dee.
On January 16, 1978, respondent's Answer was stricken
and his default entered.
On January 31, 1978, appellant filed a Notice of
Default Hearing, which hearing was to be held on February 1,

1978, before Judge Marcellus K. Snow.
filed a Motion to Vacate Default.

On February 1, responden

As grounds for his Motion,

respondent represented that he had been ill and that his illnes
had caused him to be late in responding to discovery.

Responde

incorrectly represented that he had partially responded to dis·
covery prior to the entry of default.

The record reflects that

respondent's Response to Written Interrogatories or to Demand
for Admissions was filed on February 1, 1978. (R. 60)

On

February 1, Judge Snow granted respondent's Hotion to Set Aside
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Default, and further ordered "that no more continuances will be
granted."

(R. 59)
On February 8, 1978, Mr. Gayle Dean Hunt withdrew as

counsel for respondent, and although no entry of appearance is
fuund inthe file, Jed W. Shields became counsel for respondent.
On February 15, 1978, the trial in this matter was
set for March 17, 1978.

On March 14, 1978, Mr. Shields requested

a continuance of the trial date in spite of the Order of Judge
Snow.

Counsel gave as the reason

fo~

the requested continuance

the fact that he had another trial set for March 17, and noticed
up his motion for March 15, the day following the date of his
motion.

By Order filed March 15, 1978, Judge David B. Dee con-

tinued the trial of this case to April 7, 1978.
By Order of Judge Dee filed March 22, 1978, respondent
was ordered to supply more complete answers to the Interrogatories
of appellant, said answers to be submitted by March 24, 1978.
The file contains no record of respondent ever having complied
with said Order; however, at a hearirtg on October 17, 1978,
appellant indicated that she received a single sheet of paper
through her attorney a few days prior to the April 7 trial date,
which sheet of paper purported to be answers as compelled by
the March 22nd Order.

(R. 803 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.)

By Minute Entry dated April 7, 1978, the divorce was
granted and a settlement reached between appellant and respondent
was read into the record.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

and a Decree of Divorce were filed on May 19, 1978.

On June 20,
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1978, a Motion and Order were presented to Judge Dee which recited that the Findings and Decree entered on May 19, 1978
were erroneously entered.

Therefore, new Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were entered on June
22, 1978.
On July 20, 1978, appellant filed a Motion for Relief
from Final Decree pursuant to Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., alleging
(1) that she had obtained material and relevant information
regarding the real property of the parties which could not
have

been discovered by due diligence in time to move for

a new trial, (2) that defendant, Milan Mack Boyce, had been
guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct in relation
to the divorce action, and (3) that she had entered into the
oral stipulation for setdement while under duress.

This

Motion was scheduled by appellant to be heard on October 2, 197i
but pursuant to a request for special setting filed by respondB
an Order for Special Setting was signed by Judge Dee on July 27
1978, and hearing on the Motion was set for July 31, 1978.
On August 1, 1978, the hearing on appellant's Motion
was heard and based upon the affidavit of appellant filed Augur
1978 (R. 182) the divorce decree was in effect set aside, and b
Minute Entry of the same date, Judge Dee ordered "All real pro·
perty and cash to be restored as they were on April 7, 1978."
(R. 162)

An Order reflecting the results of the August 1, 1978

hearing was drawn up by counsel for appellant but was never
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
signed
by Judge
Dee. (R. 221-224)
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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On August 17, 1978, R.M. Child entered his appearance
as counsel for appellant.
On approximately August 21, 1978, respondent filed
his Petition to Set Aside the Temporary Order of the Court and
to Restore the Decree of Divorce Herein, and an Objection to
form of the proposed Order submitted by appellant, in which he
protested that it would be impossible for respondent to comply
with the Court's Order of August 1, 1978.

Respondent's Petition

and Objections came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge
Dee on September 8, 1978.

However, by reason of the fact that

appellant had filed a Notice of Appeal contemporaneously with
her Motion for Relief From Final Decree and Notice of Intent to
Appeal, the file was not before the Court.
At that hearing Judge Dee questioned his authority
exercised on August 1, 1978 in setting aside the Divorce Decree
by reason of the prior filing of appellant's Notice of Appeal
(R. 149) and suggested that if appellant dismissed the appeal
to the Supreme Court, the trial court could again assume jurisdiction to hear appellant's Motion for Relief From Final Decree.
(R. 774, 789)
Judge Dee further indicated that the Motion for Relief
From Final Decree should be refiled as "a proper Rule 60(b) motion"
(R. 788), and set the matter for hearing on October 17, 1978.
Appellant, respondent and the Court presumed that
appellant could not conduct discovery unless and until the Divorce Decree had been set aside.

From the transcript of the

Sponsored by8,
the S.J.
Quinney hearing
Law Library. Funding
provided bypages
the Institute contain
of Museum and Library
Services
September
1978
thefor digitization
following
material
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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which show that the indicated persons presumed discovery could n1
proceed:

The Court - R. 782; appellant - R. 784, 785, 786; respr

dent - R. 781, 785, 786.

From the transcript of the October 17,

1978 hearing the following pages show the same:
R. 887; appellant - R. 886-87.

the Court -

(See Appendix 1 attached)

Appellant subsequently on September 12, 1978 voluntari:
withdrew her appeal to the Supreme Court and on September 13, 19"
filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Decree (in whole or in pa1
Commencing at 2:00p.m. on October 17, 1978, hearing
was held before Judge Dee on the various motions which had there·
tofore been filed by the parties.
At the beginning of the October 17th hearing, counsel
for respondent represented to the Court that he had an affidavit
of some length to counter the Affidavit in Support of Motion for
Relief from Final Decree filed by appellant on August 1, 1978.
Counsel for respondent also represented that he had case law
standing for the proposition that the Court had no authority to
set aside the Decree.

(R. 795) The Court invited counsel to

submit whatever affidavits or law he might have and then permitt
the hearing to go forward.
At the hearing, appellant called four witnesses to
testify and had three more prepared to testify.

The purpose of

this testimony was only to place before the Court evidence previ
ously set forth in the affidavit of appellant upon which the Cou
relied in indicating its intent to set aside the decree on August 1, 1978.

The evidence and Exhibits offered by appellant at

this hearing are more specifically referred to in the second par
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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of this Statement of Facts.

No evidence was offered by the

respondent.
After approximately two hours of testimony the Court
announced that it had another commitment.

The Court stated:

"And I've already got the feeling for whether or not this matter
should be opened up based on the testimony so far."

(R. 887-888)

The Court gave counsel for respondent one week to
submit a memorandum on the issue of whether the court had
authority to set aside the Divorce Decree in whole or in part.
(R. 889)

Appellant was given leave to file reply to respondent's

memorandum.

The Court indicated that after said memorandum had

been filed the Court would hold further hearing for argument on
whether the Court would "open it up." (R. 887)
On October 24, 1978, respondent filed his memorandum
captioned "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside
Decree (in whole or in part) and Plaintiff's Motion for Relief
From Final Decree."

(R. 538)

Reference was made therein to

a counter-affidavit by respondent which was never in fact received by appellant until December 6, 1978. Said Motion was in
fact a Memorandum of Law which sought to establish that the
trial court was without authority to set aside the Decree.

In

response to this Motion, appellant submitted her Memorandum in
Support of the Court's Authority to Set Aside Decree on or about
October 31, 1978.
-9-
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Following this, and because respondent had made no
child support payments since the August 1st hearing, a Request
for Early Ruling dated November 17, 1978 was filed with the Cour
followed by a Request for Ruling dated December 19, 1978.
On December 29, 1978, Judge Dee handed down his Memorandum Decision.

After stating it was the Court's opinion that

appellant had failed to establish a basis upon which her motion:
could be granted, the Court stated as follows:
The Court is of the opinion that all the information contained in the subsequent Affidavit and all
of the allegations both pro and con contained in
Affidavits filed by defendant and Counter-Affidavits
by plaintiff were well known to the plaintiff and
her competent counsel prior to the original Decree
having been entered into on the 19th of May, 1978,
and also prior to the entering into the Stipulation
of the 7th of April, 1978.
(R. 529)
After the Memorandum Decision was handed down but
before any Order was signed by Judge Dee, appellant filed a
Motion to Modify Divorce Decree and for Leave to Take Depositions. (R. 566-570)

The Motion to Modify was based on the conti

ing jurisdiction vested in the divorce court by Section 30-3-5,
U.C.A., 1953, as amended.

Said Motion requested that Judge Dee

consider appellant's prior motions as being motions to modify
the decree of divorce entered June 22, 1978 and also requested
that the Court delay ruling thereon and for leave of Court to
take depositions "In order to determine the full facts and true
holdings and earnings of the defendant for the guidance of the
Court."

(R. 567)

This Motion was filed on January 25, 1979

and
was in effect denied by Judge Dee.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An Amended Judgment and Order was signed by Judge Dee
and filed January 31, 1979.

Appellant filed her Notice of

Appeal on February 27, 1979.
The preceding procedural over-view was given in an
attempt to show the status of this matter before Judge Dee
entered his Order denying the relief sought by appellant.
B.

Facts learned after divorce as compared with

respondent's representations at time bf divorce
As was stated above, appellant sought relief from
the lower court for fraud she alleges was perpetrated on her
and the court below.

Because of the inherent difficulty in

showing fraud, appellant considers it essential to set forth
the operative facts showing fraud in the detail as hereafter
set forth.
In his Response to Written Interrogatories filed
February 1, 1978, respondent

delivered to appellant a Financial

Statement dated April 30, 1977 and which was originally given to
Zions First National Bank.

Said Financial Statement shows respon-

dent as having a net worth of $814,637.39 with total assets of
$962,367.43.

(R.78 and Defendant's Exhibit 7)

On the date of the divorce trial, April 17, 1978,
respondent represented to the Court and to the appellant that he
had total assets of $300,000.00 and debts of $100,000.00.

This

situation was confirmed to this Court on April 16, 1979 when in
oral arguments on a motion in this matter, respondent's counsel
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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When the decree of divorce was entered,
basically you were dealing with a total balance
sheet of $300,000 in assets and $100,000 in
liabilities. (Transcribed from tape recording
of proceedings before the Supreme Court on April
16, 1979, Law and Motion Calendar)
Appellant relied on the representations of respondent
in deciding whether to enter into the offered settlement.

Had

these representations been true, the settlement agreed on which
awarded appellant $98,000 as property distribution and $2,000
lump-sum alimony for a total of $100,000 cash, and which left
respondent -with the assets and liabilities of the parties,
would indeed have been just and equitable.

Judge Dee in ex-

plaining his unwillingness to award attorney's fees even charac
terized the settlement as "the handsome settlement you got."
(R. 241)

However, as the following discussion will point out,

the settlement was far from "handsome" and in fact grossly
inequitable and unjust.

According to the testimony of appellant at the
October 17, 1978 hearing, respondent's representation on April
7, 1978 that his net worth was only $200,000 was made and substr
tiated in the following fashion:
(1)

On or about April 7, 1978 respondent supplied

appellant with a document entitled "Contract and Agreement" and
a document entitled "Addendum Number One."
2 and 3, respectively)

(Plaintiff's Exhibit

The Contract and Agreement indicated tha

on December 1, 1975 respondent sold his interest in all of his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"for $10.00 and other valuable consideration."

Addendum Number

One modifies some of the terms of the original Contract and
Agreement but indicates that on February 1, 1977, respondent's
parents were still the owners of the corporations.

Likewise,

in "answer" to an Order Compelling Answers, respondent supplied
to appellant a single typed page indicating that he no longer
owned any stock in any of the corporations he had organized.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1)
Appellant testified on October 17th that the first
time she saw Plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3 was within a few days
before the April 7, 1978 hearing.

She further testified that

although she was listed as Secretary-Treasurer of the corporations
for some years, she had no knowledge of the transfer of corporate
ownership from respondent to his parents.

(R. 834-387)

The

effect of these representations was to lead appellant to believe
on April 7, 1978 that although the Financial Statement of April
30, 1977 indicated that respondent owned the corporations and
had a net worth in excess of $800,000, as a result of the transfer of corporate ownership he no longer owned those assets.
(2)
~

Appellant and respondent jointly owned ten

acre lots in the Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision in Salt Lake

County.

Within a few days before the April 7, 1978 divorce

hearing, respondent delivered to appellant a certified appraisal
dated March 13, 1978. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4)

According to that

appraisal each lot had an estimated value of $4,650 for a total
value of the property of $46,500.

(R. 809-810)

Thus respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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represented to and appellant acted upon the belief that said
property had only a value of $46,500.
( J)
~'

The personal residence of the parties was repre-

sented by respondent to have a market value of $100,000 with
encumbrances of $83,463 ($54,368 to Zions Bank and $39,095 to
American Concrete Construction, Inc.).

(R. 66) · This left an

equity of $16,537.
(4)

Appellant and respondent jointly held property

located at 1295 East 4800 South in Salt Lake City.

In his

answers to Interrogatories respondent represented the value
of the property to be $55,000 with encumbrances totalling
$63,055 ($40,000 to Zions Bank and $32,055 to Rhea B. Jacobs
Groves Estate). (R. 66)

Within a few days prior to the April 7,

1978 divorce hearing respondent delivered to appellant a certified appraisal report dated March 13, 1978 which gave as the
value of the property $65,000.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5)

All of the foregoing information which was given to
appellant by respondent seemed to support respondent's representation that on April 7, 1978 he had total assets of $300,000
with liabilities of $100,000 for a net worth of $200,000.
However, as also shown by the testimony at the hearing
of October 17, 1978, some time in May, 1978 respondent atternptei
to borrow approximately $100,000 from the Lockhart Company and
in connection with this loan application gave Lockhart a Financial Statement dated May 1, 1978.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 8)

Statement
showed the following:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That

(1)

Respondent included as his own the assets of the

corporations he had purportedly sold to his parents.

On cross-

examination of Thomas Pike, Vice-President of The Lockhart Company, counsel for respondent asked if Mr. Boyce hadn't informed
him that the.Financial_Statement included total Boyce family
assets.

Mr. Pike, who dealt with respondent, testified that

he did not recall that any of the assets listed on the Statement were assets of others than the respondent.

(R. 840-841)

When Mr. Pike was asked what the Lockhart Company considered
respondent's net worth to be, he answerd, "I would say the
figure on the financial statement Lof May7." (R. 844)
(2)

The May 1 Financial Statement shows a fair market

value of $250,000 for the ten

~

acre lots in Dimple Dell Oaks.

Mr. Pike of the Lockhart Company testified on October 17 that his
company had the lots appraised and made a loan based on the
value of the property being $260,000.

(R. 846-847)

Thus on

May 1, 1978 respondent represented to Lockhart and Lockhart
found the value of these lots to be in excess of five times
what respondent had represented their value to be on April 7,

1978, three weeks earlier.

The Financial Statement of May 1

also reflects that the liens in favor of American Concrete
Construction, Inc. were no longer on the property.
In this regard it should be noted that respondent was
President of American Concrete Construction, Inc.

Release of

all liens in the name of that corporation immediately following
the Sponsored
divorce
of the parties must indicate to an impartial observer
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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d

that the presence of said liens in the course of the divorce
proceeding was a sham and a fraud upon the court and the appella
(3)

In the May 1 statement the former residence of

the parties is listed as having a market value of $150,000.
mortgage in the sum of $35,728.32 is listed.

A

The liens in favor

of American Concrete Construction, Inc., again, no longer encum·
ber the property.

(4)

The property located at 1295 East 4800 South is

listed in the May 1 Statement as having a market value of $125,(
with a mortgage of $11,502.50.

Thus respondent represented

to Lockhart on Xa.1 ::., 1978 this piece of property to have a
value double that which he represented to appellant three
weeks earlier on April 7, 1978.
The Financial Statement of May 1, 1978 reflects
respondent's net worth as being $1,154,690.10 with total assets
of $1,383,920.92.

This is a considerable improvement over his

financial status approximately three weeks earlier when he
represented to appellant and the trial court a net worth of

$200,000 with total assets of $300,000.

-16-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR
SHOWS SUCH AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S RULE 60(b)
MOTION AND MOTION TO MODIFY DECREE
THAT THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND
REMAND WITH DIRECTIONS TO SET ASIDE
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND REOPEN
THE CASE ON THE ISSUES OF PROPERTY
DIVISION, ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
A divorce action is a proceeding in equity.

v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974).

Iverson

It follows that a Motion

to Modify a divorce decree must be considered an equitable matter.
Indeed it is submitted that a Rule 60(b) Motion such as that
initially brought by appellant is an equitable matter.
This Court has the responsibility to review the
evidence in a case in equity.

Article VIII, Section 9 Utah

State Constitution; Section 78-2-2, U.C.A., 1953, as amended;
Rule 72(a), U.R.C.P.; Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co.,
6 Utah 2d 177, 178, 308 P.2d 954 (1957).
The weight to be given by this Court to the findings
of the trial court has been stated in various ways.

The following

statement is found in the case of Richins v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356,
412 P.2d 314 (1966):
. . . It is the duty and the prerogative of
this court to review both the law and the
facts and to consider the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. However, in such cases
we make allowance for the advantages the trial
court has because of proximity to the parties,
the witnesses and the trial. (Footnotes omitted)
(17 Utah 2d at 358)
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In referring specifically to a situation involving
a requested modification of a divorce ;decree this Court in
Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 280, 488 P.2d 308 (1971),
stated:
This proceeding seeking to modify the
divorce decree is in equity; and it is the
prerogative of this court to review the
evidence, to make its own findings, and to
substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court when the ends of justice so require.
However, due to the prerogatives and advantaged position of the trial court, we pursue
that broad authorization under certain rules
of review which are now well established:
Its actions are indulged with a presumption
of validity and correctness and the burden
is upon the appellant to show a basis for
upsetting them: either (1) that findings
have been made when the evidence clearl
preponderates the other way; or
that
there has been a misunderstanding or misapplicEcion of the law resulting in substantia] a~d prejudicial error; or (3) that
it abpears plainly that there has been SUCh
an a use of discretion that an ine uit or
injustice has resulted.
Emphasis added
(Footnotes omitted)
More recently in the case of Ingram v. Forrer,
563 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1977) this Court stated:
While in equity cases we accord due
regard to the position of a trial judge in
making his findings of fact, we are not
required to affirm him where it appears
that he has erred. (Citing, Article VIII,
Sec. 9, Utah State Constitution; First Security
Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 10 Utah 2d 405, 354 P.2d
97 (1960); Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469
P.2d 504 (1970))
In the case of Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 384,
375 P.2d 28 (1962), Mr. Justice Crockett writing for this Court
stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

We are in accord with the proposition
urged by the defendant that~the trial court
has broad discretion in granting new trials·
and in allowing relief under Rule 60(b).
'
But its power is not without limitation and
can~ot be exercised capriciously or arbitrarily.
It ~s elementary that under usual circumstances
the regular rules of procedure are binding, and
that a party who has allowed the time to move
for a new trial to expire is thereafter precluded from doing so.
This can be avoided only
where it is made to appear that for one or more
of the reasons specified in Rule 60(b) justice
ha~ been so thwarted that equity and good consc~ence demand that this extraordinary relief be
granted.
And the burden of showing facts to
justify doing so is upon him who seeks such relief.
It is respectfully submitted that when this Court
reviews the evidence, it will be abundantly clear that the trial
court erred in that ''it appears plainly that there has been such
an abuse of discretion that an inequity or injustice has resulted."

A review of the record in the case at bar shows that
respondent through trickery, misrepresentations and fraud accomplished his purpose of obtaining a grossly inequitable proportion of the assets of the parties.

His plan seems to have been

to (1) transfer all of his corporate holdings to members of
his family while maintaining complete control of those assets and
all without the knowledge of appellant, and (2) encumber all
jointly held property while understating the true value thereof.
This inequitable and plainly fraudulent conduct was
pointed out to the trial court.

It was an abuse of discretion

for the trial court to refuse to correct this inequity.

An

injustice had been done and the trial court refused to do equity.
Therefore this Court should reverse the trial court and remand
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of property settlement, alimony and child support.

Furthermore,

the appellant should be permitted to make use of the full range
of discovery devices in order to present the true status of
respondent's financial condition to the trial court.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THE AFFIDAVITS OF RESPONDENT IN THE
FACE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
APPELLANT AT THE OCTOBER 17 HEARING
As was stated under Point I above, the evidence put
on by appellant at the October 17 hearing was the only evidence
that was actually presented to the trial court.

At the end

of the October 1- hearing appellant had additional witnesses
waiting to tes::J. :'y.
Respondent has never offered any competent material
evidence in rebuttal to the evidence adduced by appellant at
the October 17 hearing.

Instead, respondent submitted a volu-

minous, rambling, largely irrelevant affidavit.

This affidavit

cannot be considered as evidence in the face of testimony by
witnesses in open court because appellant was not afforded the
right to cross-examine any of the affiants connected with said
affidavit.

This Court has recognized that the right to cross-

examine is a valuable right.

Hunter v. Michaelis,ll4 Utah 242,

198 P.2d 245, 251 (1948).
Furthermore, jurisdictions which have considered
the question have uniformly held that, at least in the absence
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of a statute permitting it, affidavits are not competent
evidence to establish the facts contained therein.

See, e.g.,

Holton v. Laucomer, 504 P.2d 872 (Hawaii 1972); Crabtree v.
Measday, 508 P.2d 1317 (N.M. App. 1973), cert. den. 508 P.2d
1302; Caye v. Caye, 211 P.2d 252 (Nev. 1949).
Professor Wigmore states at Section 1384 in the Third
Edition of his treatise on evidence:
Upon the principles already examined,
it is clear that a mere affidavit- i.e. a
statement made upon oath before an officer
--is inadmissible . . . .
A case very similar to the one at bar in which the
issue of the admissibility of affidavits was decided is Pavaroff
v. Pavaroff, 130 P.2d 212 (Cal. App. 1942).

That case involved

a motion to modify a divorce decree with respect to custody of
minor children.

The trial court denied the motion based not

only on the oral testimony of witnesses but on affidavits which it
had received in evidence over objection.

In reversing the trial

court for receiving the affidavits in the

~

£c~

of oral testi-

mony by the other party, the reviewing court stated:
It is elemental that the issue below,
pertaining as it did solely to the custody
of minor children, could not have been tried
wholly or in part on affidavits in the original divorce proceeding, over objection.
This for the reason that evidence by way of
affidavit on controverted issues of fact is
an inappropriate link in the chain of proof.
From time immemorial it has been a fundamental
precept of the common law that testimony to
sustain a cause of action, a defense thereto
or any other issuable controverted fact must
-21-
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be given in open court or by deposition
with cross-examination then and there
accorded. Where cross-examination was
not accorded, not only was the testimony
classed as being hearsay but it was considered too uncertain and unreliable to
be considered in the investigation of
controverted facts, and should therefore
not be received as evidence. As an affidavit is but the ex parte sworn statement or testimony of the affiant, it was
acco~dingly inadmissible at the common
law on a controverted issue of fact.

***
In short, the common law, accepting the
experience of ages, regarded cross-examination of a witness or affiant as to his
relation to the case or parties, his
motives, if any, his means of knowledge
and opportunities for information, his
powers of observation and tenacity of
T.emcc'" as ::>f prime importance to test
"hE :=edibility and accuracy of his statements, so as to render reliance thereon
safe. (130 P.2d at 213)
Appellant objected to the use of respondent's affidavits as evidence.

On November 4, 1978 appellant wrote to the

Honorable Judge Dee regarding possible use of affidavits by the
respondent saying, "If the defendant had evidence for the Court
he should properly have submitted it in form other than affidavi
(Appendix 2)

Again in her Request for Ruling dated December 19,

1978, respondent stated:
. . . the plaintiff believes the "Answer and
Counter Affidavits to Plaintiff's Affidavit
in Support of Motion for Relief from Final
Decree," consisting of approximately one
hundred fifty pages filed by the defendant
with the Court on or about the 6th or 7th
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d~y of December, 1978, contains multiple
mlsstatements and untruths and constitutes
an attempt by the defendant to get evidence
before the Court without taking the stand
under oath and without permitting the opportunity of cross examination. (R. 531
Appendix 3)
'

Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the use
of affidavits only in fairly limited circumstances.

Affidavits

may be used in regard to motions for summary judgment (Rule 56(e));
application for new trial

(Rule~(c));

disqualification of a judge

(Rule 63(b)); provisional and final remedies (Rules 64A, 64B,
64C, 64D and 71B); and appeals by indigents (Rule 73(c)).
On August 1, 1978, faced with an
date, appellant submitted an affidavit.

accelerated hearing

(R. 182)

However, she

y-·?t--{,\'!_,,1..

had witnesses present whom the Court

re~~eseed

to hear.

(R. 750)

On October 17, 1978 appellant presented evidence both
by way of testimony in open court and documents, identified and
received in evidence as Exhibits.

Appellant's witnesses were

subject to cross-examination by respondent.
to put on evidence of any kind.

Respondent failed

It is clear that the trial

court relied heavily on the matters contained in respondent's
affidavits in deciding whether the motions should be granted.
To do so was error, an abuse of discretion, and prejudicial to
appellant.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this case
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to reopen

-23-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the divorce proceedings on the question of what is a fair and
equitable property settlement becween the parties.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
APPELLANT TO REMOVE THE LIS PENDENS
SHE HAD FILED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE CASE AT BAR
On or about July 31, 1978, appellant filed for record
a Notice of Lis Pendens pursuant to Section 78-40-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

Said Notice applied to the three

properties held in joint tenancy by appellant and respondent
during their marriage and was necessary because appellant had
Quit-Claimed her interest in said properties to the respondent
pursuant to the

~cree

8f Divorce.

Said properties included the

family residence on Top-of-the-World Drive, the ten lots in
Dimple Dell Oaks Subdivision and the property located at 1295
East 4800 South. (R. 214-215)
Section 78-40-2 provides in pertinent part:
In any action affecting the title to, or the
right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter . . . may file for record with
the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a
notice of the pendency of the action . . . .
From the time of filing such notice for
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.
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Although the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue, the courts of other jurisdictions have found that a
divorce action is a proper subject for a notice of lis pendens.
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted this position by analogizing
to a prior Colorado case involving a suit for separate maintenance in the case of Clopine v. Kemper, 344 P.2d 451 (1959).

The

Oklahoma Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in the case
of Bowman v. Bowman, 206 P.2d 582 (1949).
In Utah, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear
divorce suits.

Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code Annotated gives

the district courts power to "make such orders in relation to
the . . . property . . . of the parties

. as may be equitable."

The district court is also given continuing jurisdiction with
respect to "the distribution of property . . . "

Hence, in Utah

a divorce action must be considered an action "affecting the
title to, or the right of possession of, real property."
In the case of Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190
(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The sole purpose of recording a notice of
lis pendens is to give constructive notice of
the pendency of the proceeding; its only foundation is in the action filed--it has no existence
independent of it.
Both Section 78-40-2 and the Hansen case make it
clear that so long as an action is pending, that action will
support a lis pendens.

Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition,
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defines "pendency" as follows:
Suspense; the state of being pendent.or undecided;
the state of an action, etc., after 1t has been
begun, and before the final disposition of it.
(emphasis added)
It is a settled rule in Utah that a judgment, and
hence an action, is not final until the time for appeal has
expired or an appeal timely taken has been disposed of.

The

Supreme Court in Young v. Hansen, 117 Utah 607, 218 P.2d 674,
675 (1950) stated:
In the cases of State Bank of Sevier v. American
Cement and Plaster Co., 80 Utah 250, 10 P.2d 1065;
Vance v. Heath, 42 Utah 148, 129 P 365; and Schramm
- Johnson Drugs v. Kleeb, 51 Utah 159, 169 P 161,
this court held that a judgment is not final pending
appeal .
This rule is seQe7alized in 51 AmJur 2d, Lis Pendens, Section 32
as follows:
Under what may be designated as a general
rule that is subject to exceptions, once the
doctrine of lis pendens comes into operation in
connection with particular litigation, it remains
in operation until the rendition of a final decision that puts a definite end to the litigation.
(citing, inter alia, Dupee v. Salt Lake Valley
Loan and Trust Company, 20 Utah 103, 57 P 845)
The instant matter is in all respects still "pending"
hence the lis pendens filed in connection herewith fully complie
with the law.

That being the case it was error and an abuse of

discretion for the trial court to order the appellant to withdraw and cancel the lis pendens she has recorded in connection
with this action.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN NO WAY
BOUND BY THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES
BUT HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DO '
EQUITY
The divorce court as a court of equity had a duty to
see that equity was done insofar as the distribution of the
marital assets and the setting of alimony.
This Court speaking through Mr. Justice Maughan in
Strong v. Strong, 548 P.2d 626, 627 (1976) stated:
In Callister v. Callister, /I Utah 2d 34,
41, 261 P.2d 944 (19531/, this court stated
that Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953, gave the
Courts power to disregard the stipulations
or agreements of the parties and enter judgment
for such alimony or child support as appeared
reasonable; to modify such judgments when a
change of circumstances justified it; regardless
of attempts of the parties to control the matter by contract.
Likewise, Mr. Justice Crockett in Klein v. Klein,
544 P.2d 472, 476 (1975), stated:
It is the established rule that a stipulation
pertaining to matters of divorce, custody and
property rights therein, though advisory upon
the court and would usually be followed unless
the court thought it unfair or unreasonable,
is not necessarily binding on the court anyway.
It is only a recommendation to be adhered to
if the court believes it to be fair and reasonable. (Citing ogenshaw v. Olenshaw, 102
Utah 22, 126 P.2d 1 68, and Cal ister)
Mr. Justice Crockett also stated in Mathie v. Mathie,
12 Utah 2d 116, 123, 363 P.2d 779 (1961):
The parties cannot by contract completely
defeat the authority expressly conferred upon
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the court by our statute, Sec. 30-3-5,
U.C.A. 1953, in cases of divorce, to
"make such orders in relation to * * *
property*** as may be equitable."
Under it there can be no doubt of the
court's prerogative to make whatever
disposition of the property, including
the rights in such a contract, as it
deems fair, equitable and necessary
for the protection and welfare of the
parties.
Based on the duty imposed by Section 30-3-5 and the
record in the case at bar, it is clear (1) that the court was
prevented from performing its duty at the time of the Divorce
by the misrepresentations of the defendant, and (2) that the
lower court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the
Decree of Divorce as it related to property distribution, alimon;
and child

supp~r:.

This Court has gone so far as to direct a decree which
it considers just and equitable in situations where the trial
court has failed to do equity.

In Hendricks v. Hendricks, 63

P.2d 277, 279 (1939) this Court stated:
.The decree in each case must be determined
upon the facts, the conditions, and the circumstances of the parties in each particular case,
and that if, upon examination of the record,
this court is convinced that the award in the
trial court is inequitable and unjust, it should
direct such decree as it finds to be just and
equitable.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's
refusal to set aside the divorce decree has resulted in an
unjust and inequitable award.

Therefore this Court should
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reverse the trial court and remand with instructions to set aside
the decree insofar as the same relates to property distribution,
alimony and child support, and to permit appellant to proceed
with the discovery she needs to fully inform the lower court
of the fraud perpetrated on that court and appellant.
POINT V
THE OUTCOME OF THIS APPEAL MAY
DECIDE WHETHER APPELLANT WILL
EVER BE ABLE TO OBTAIN RELIEF
FOR THE FRAUD PERPETRATED ON HER
Because of the trial court's refusal to grant the
relief requested by appellant, appellant filed a Complaint in
the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. C79-1221, on
February 22, 1979.

(R. 692-734)

That case is captioned Doreen

Boyce v. Insulation Corporation of America, et al.

That action

is one for fraud and conspiracy and is an attempt to show the
involvement of respondent's corporations, elderly parents and
elderly aunt in putting respondent's assets and property beyond
the reach of appellant.

Since the Honorable Judge Dee had by

his Order in the divorce action closed the door to the discovery
required by appellant, it was intended that the fraud action would
permit appellant to pursue such discovery in order to establish
the extent of her damage.
However, the defendants in that action have been able
to convince the District Court to set aside scheduled depositions
and stay proceedings until this case is decided on appeal.

This
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is more particularly set forth in the petition filed with this
Court of Doreen Boyce, plaintiff, for leave to file an intermediate appeal from Order staying proceedings in Civil No.
C79-1221 and consolidate same with this appeal now pending, and
defendants' Response thereto, one of which defendants is respondent here.
It is emphasized that the testimony put on by appellant at the hearing of October 17, 1978 was intended only to
make a sufficient showing of fraud to allow the trial court to
reopen the divorce.

It was expected that if reopened, this

would allow the discovery necessary to fully inform the court
of the nature and extent of the respondent's true assets and the
fraud

perpetra~ed

on the court and appellant.

The October 17

hearing was not intended to, and it did not, amount to formal
proof of common law fraud.
The Honorable Judge Dee on August 1, 1978 had ruled
the Divorce to be set aside and the parties restored to the
economic status quo as of April 7, 1978 on the mere representation by counsel of what appellant's affidavit showed.
On October 17, 1978, the appellant reduced the contents of that affidavit to substantive evidence found in testimony and Exhibits.

No other or additional testimony was deemed

to be necessary at that time and indeed the full nature and
extent of the fraud cannot be determined without the opportunity
of discovery.
-30-
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The respondent should not be permitted to retain the
disproportionate distribution of marital assets he received
through fraud, connivance and misrepresentation.

If the ruling

of Honorable David B. Dee is allowed to stand the appellant
will be unable to secure relief and her equitable share of the
marital estate in the divorce action itself.

Furthermore, that

ruling if allowed to stand and become final will undoubtedly be
urged as a bar to appellant's action in D. Boyce v. Insulation
Corporation of America, et al. Civil No. C79-1221.

(See Petition

for leave to appeal from order staying proceedings and to consolidate same with this case on appeal and Response

thereto~

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing analysis
has shown that the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to reopen the divorce and/or modify the decree after opportunity
for discovery on the questions of property distribution, alimony
and child support.

This Honorable Court should therefore reverse

the trial court and remand with instructions to reopen the divorce on the issues stated above and to permit the appellant to
proceed with discovery.
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE, CHILD & RITCHIE

/S/
R. M. Child
Attorneys for Appellant
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APPENDIX 1
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The following is taken from the transcript of the
hearing of September 8, 1978, to show that the lower court,
counsel for appellant and counsel for respondent each assumed
that discovery could not proceed until the divorce decree had
been set aside:
MR. SHIELDS:

What I would like to know procedurally,

how is the plaintiff before this Court to take any depositions?
There are some limitations to taking depositions.
THE COURT:
MR. SHIELDS:
THE COURT:

Well, by the dismissal of the of the appea
There is a Decree.
Then--then this Court has continuing juris

diction over tnis matter after the Decree is entered.
MR. SHIELDS:
THE COURT:

Right.
And to Rule 60(b), if there's a proper

showing that there is reason for us to look at the Decree on
the grounds of one of those subparagraphs which you claim.
of course, I'd look at it in terms of setting it aside,
or whatever.

Then

modify~

So I guess the next move is to file a motion, and

maybe what you have already done highlights that, to look at it
as a 60(b) motion.
MR. SHIELDS:

There's nothing--that's correct.

nothing before the Court now.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There'

THE COURT:
that's what you do.

I'm telling Mr. Childs (sic) if there isn't,
If I grant it, you take depositions.

***

(R. 781-82)

MR. CHILD:

60(b), I think we have properly brought

before the Court, but Mr. Shields points out the problem.

The

rules say that depositions may be taken after judgment only
by leave of Court for purposes of preserving testimony.
MR. SHIELDS:
MR. CHILD:

Right.
I think that's what he had in mind when he

said you do have some limitations on depositions.

But if the

Court gave assurance I could use the depositions to explore-THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. CHILD:

If Mr. Shields is going to object to that,

then we're going to have a lot of troubles and so forth, so I
assume.
Now, if I might point out to the Court this.

I do not

accept the fact that this Court lost jurisdiction until that
record went up on appeal-THE COURT:

I understand.

MR. CHILD:

--because this Court had the right to grant

an extension of I think up to two months beyond the forty days
for the record to go up on appeal for purposes of doing things
the Court required in the case.
MR. SHIELDS:

Only--
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MR. CHILD:

Now--

MR. SHIELDS:

--there's a limitation on that.

have the rule before me.

And I

There is a limitation only for the

purpose, Your Honor, of doing whatever needs to be done or
corrected to make the appeal proper.

You see Mr. Child has for·

gotten part of the--part of the rule.

But that's what it says,

because I have it in front of me.
MR. CHILD:
MR. SHILEDS:
MR. CHILD:

(Indicating.)

That may be.
That is.
That may be.

though, Your Honor, is this.

The point I'm getting at,

I don't believe that the August ls'

ruling of the Court would be beyond the Court's power.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. CHILD:

And if that ruling stands, it was really

accomplishing exactly what everybody needs.
Decree was set aside.

And that was the

At that point discovery could be started

again, unlimited discovery could start again, and that's what we
really need right now in order to properly put the parties back
in the positions they were on April 7th and protect interest pn
blems and things of this type.

I think we could all move with

dispatch.
MR. SHIELDS:

But the order has been set aside.

All

I'm saying, if the Court please, Mr. Child is not before this
Court.

There is a final Decree.

And the only thing--if he

withdraws the appeal, the only thing he's in front of the Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with is a motion to reform the decree, which you have indicated
is improper and it's not there.

Now, this is equivalent, as I

see it, to some lawyers coming in, they get a decree, the whole
thing is over with, final, ended, the decree is signed.

All

of a sudden you get a notification from one of the counsel
we're going to start taking depositions.

That can't be done,

you see.
MR. CHILD:
MR. SHIELDS:

That's the problem.
Well, it can't be.

There's nothing be-

fore the Court.
MR. CHILD:

That's the problem, but once vacated it's

before the Court.
THE COURT:

Under 60--

MR. CHILD:

Yes. Once vacated--

THE COURT:

--if I grant that?

MR. CHILD:

Once the Notice of Appeal is vacated it's

before the Court, but I don't think we can proceed with depositions until the Court rules the Decree bas been set aside in
order to reevaluate the property distribution, so-MR. SHIELDS:
missing one point.

But we're missing--I'm sorry.

We're

We're missing one point.

MR. CHILD:
MR. SHIELDS:

I think we better get it.
All right.

If the Court sets aside--

if he dismisses his appeal obviously this Court then has
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continuing jurisdiction from hence forward.
in any dispute on that.

I don't think we're

But the problem is that you just can't

go out and take deposit ions on a divorce case that's a -month old
a year old or five years old, without getting before this Court
with some kind of a motion and the only thing which I have the
right to resist.

And the only thing he has at this moment upon

which to predicate taking depositions is a motion to reform the
Decree which motion this Court has already decided is improper.
MR. CHILD:

Oh, it's--the motion is entitled Motion

for Relief From Judgment, as I recall, or Final Decree.
MR. SHIELDS:
MR. CHILD:

Well-Motion for Relief From Final Decree.

obviously brought under Rule 60.

If the designation was somewha

inartful, it doesn't deprive the Court from the motion.
(R. 783-86)

It'>

***

(All emphasis added)

Likewise, from the transcript of the hearing of
October 17, 1978, the following passages reflect the fact it
was still considered necessary to set·aside the decree before
discovery could proceed:
MR. CHTI.D:
something.

I think his last testimony has illustratec

I'm being forced to use the Court's time for purposE

of discovery, and I have Milan C. Boyce in the hall.

If the Co\

is inclined, and once we get over this hurdle, once the Court L
it does, sets aside in part the decree so we are actually
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look~

into what the property interests are, then we can proceed with
depositions, but the rules don't allow depositions until that's
been opened up for that purpose.

And so I think an orderly de-

velopment dictates that both Mrs. Boen and the Boyces, Sr., really
shouldn't take the Court's time the way we are doing it this
afternoon.
THE COURT:

Well, this is a matter of discovery.

And

youre saying until I open this up to see whether or not, and
that would have to be on the basis of the fact Mrs. Boyce did
not know or misunderstood or didn't understand what the real
property was, then I can open that up.
MR. CHILD:

Not just the real property.

THE COURT:

Really what the property was.

Corporate

property.
I didn't

mean real property in the legal sense.
MR. CHILD:

I see.

THE COURT:

The amount of the property Mr. Boyce had

control of, if she had that matter misrepresented to her at the
time she agreed in stipulation, then, of course, I must consider
that, if that's the situation.
Why don't you, at this juncture at least, get ready to
meet, Mr. Child, Mr. Shields' objection to opening this up, because he apparently has some law on it.
MR SHIELDS:
THE COURT:

I-And why don't you brief that to the Court
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in response by Mr. Child, and I'll look at at and then I will

have another hearing on whether I'm going to open it up after
I hear those arguments.

***

(R. 886-87) (Emphasis added)
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APPENDIX 2
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Novennbe~

14, 1G78

Honorable D.:1vid B. Dee
.Judge
Thi~ District Cour-t
New Cou~ts Sui ldlng
250 EAst Fou~th South
Salt Lake Clty, Utah 84111
Re:

Boyce v. Boyce
D-26810

De a~ .Judge Dee:
In its delibe~atlons on the matte~ nOIN before tho Court ln
the above-captioned case, we assume that the Court ls not
conslde~ing a "Counter Affidavit" by the defendant, ~t'erred t:)
at page nine of ~f'endant's memorandum dated Octobe~ 25, 1978,

The plalntlt'l' has neve~ been served a copy of such "Counter
Affidavit" and would have no Idea of Its contents.
If the defendant had evidence
properly have submitted lt in fo~m

fo~

the C:>urt he should
than a"idavlt.

othe~

Respectfully,

R, M, O,lld

RMC:lc
cc: .Jed Shields
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R. M. CHILD
Attorney for Plaintiff
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Telephone: (801) 363-2091

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIC1 COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
NINA DOREEN DAVIS BOYCE,
Plaintiff,

REQUEST FOR RULING

v.

MILAN MACK BOYCE,

Civil No. D-26810

Defendant.

Plaintiff respectfully requests the above Honorable
Court that a ruling be entered in this matter on plaintiff's
Motion to Set Aside Decree and for Relief from Final Decree
based upon the evidence which was received by the Court in open
hEqring on the 17th day of October, 1978.

This request is made

upon the ground and for the reason that the plaintiff believes
the "Answer and Counter Affidavits to Plaintiff's Affidavit in
Support of Motion for Relief from Final Decree:• consisting of
approximately one hundred fifty pages filed by the defendant
with the Court on or about the 6th or 7th day of December, 1978,
contains multiple misstatements and untruths and constitutes an
attempt by the defendant to get evidence before the Court without taking the stand under oath and without permitting the
opportunity of cross-examination.

Furthermore, the contents of

said Affidavits are in nearly every respect irrelevant to the
issue before the Court on plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Decree.
Evidence was presented by the plaintiff to the Court
on the 17th day of October, 1978, that at the time of the
Stipulation and entering of the Divorce Decree herein the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff had been misled by the defendant and his counsel immediately prior to said hearing as to the values of the real
property of the parties and as to the extent of ownership of
the defendant in and to his corporations and their respective
assets.

Defendant has offered no probative testimony nor any
testimony wherein he would be subject to cross-examination which
would explain or excuse the defendant's conduct in misleading
the plaintiff and her attorney at the time scheduled for the
hearing of divorce as to the values of the properties or the
~ership

of defendant's interests in his corporations.
A prompt ruling is requested by the plaintiff for the

reason that the defendant has made no payments to the plaintiff
for the support of the minor children of the parties since payments made to cover the month of August, 1978, notwithstanding
the approach of Christmas, 1978, and further notwithstanding the
fact that on the 17th day of November, 1978, a copy of the
plaintiff's former "Request for Early Ruling" was mailed to
counsel for.the defendant.
Lest the Court construe silence on the part of the
plaintiff to be tacit acceptance of the many misstatements set
forth in the above-referred one hundred fifty-page document
filed as an Affidavit by the defendant with "Supporting Affidavits," there is attached hereto an Affidavit by the plaintiff
which does not attempt to negate all of the many misstatements
and misrepresentations set forth by the defendant, but puts the
plaintiff on record as advising the Court that she takes exception to said Affidavits and has a story of her own to tell.
c;

Respectfully submitted this ____
/ / __ day of December, 1978.

R. M. CHILD
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
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